C. Daniel Batson

The influence of several situational and personality variables on helping behavior was examined in an emergency situation suggested by the parable of the Good Samaritan. People going between two buildings encountered a shabbily dressed person slumped by the side of the road. Subjects in a hurry to reach their destination were more likely to pass by without stopping. Some subjects were going to give a short talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan, others on a nonhelping relevant topic; this made no significant difference in the likelihood of their giving the victim help. Religious personality variables did not predict whether an individual would help the victim or not. However, if a subject did stop to offer help, the character of the helping response was related to his type of religiosity.

Whether observation of distress in others leads to empathic concern and altruistic motivation, or to personal distress and egoistic motivation, seems to depend upon the capacity for self-other differentiation and cognitive appraisal. In this experiment, behavioral measures and event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging were used to investigate the effects of perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal while participants observed the facial expression of pain resulting from medical treatment. Video clips showing the faces of patients were presented either with the instruction to imagine the feelings of the patient ("imagine other") or to imagine oneself to be in the patient's situation ("imagine self"). Cognitive appraisal was manipulated by providing information that the medical treatment had or had not been successful. Behavioral measures demonstrated that perspective-taking and treatment effectiveness instructions affected participants' affective responses to the observed pain. Hemodynamic changes were detected in the insular cortices, anterior medial cingulate cortex (aMCC), amygdala, and in visual areas including the fusiform gyrus. Graded responses related to the perspective-taking instructions were observed in middle insula, aMCC, medial and lateral premotor areas, and selectively in left and right parietal cortices. Treatment effectiveness resulted in signal changes in the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex, in the ventromedial orbito-frontal cortex, in the right lateral middle frontal gyrus, and in the cerebellum. These findings support the view that humans' responses to the pain of others can be modulated by cognitive and motivational processes, which influence whether observing a conspecific in need of help will result in empathic concern, an important instigator for helping behavior.

Although often confused, imagining how another feels and imagining how you would feel are two distinct forms of perspective taking with different emotional consequences. The former evokes empathy; the latter, both empathy and distress. To test this claim, undergraduates listened to a (bogus) pilot radio interview with a young woman in serious need. One third were instructed to remain objective while listening; one third, to imagine how the young woman felt; and one third, to imagine how they would feel in her situation. The two imagine perspectives produced the predicted distinct pattern of emotions, suggesting different motivational consequences: Imagining how the other feels produced empathy, which has been found to evoke altruistic motivation; imagining how you would feel produced empathy, but it also produced personal distress, which has been found to evoke egoistic motivation.

Psychologists have long assumed that the motivation for all intentional action, including all action intended to benefit others, is egoistic. People benefit others because, ultimately, to do so benefits themselves. The empathy-altruism hypothesis challenges this assumption. It claims that empathic emotion evokes truly altruistic motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting not the self but the person for whom empathy is felt. Logical and psychological distinctions between egoism and altruism are reviewed, providing a conceptualframeworkfor empirical tests for the existence of altruism. Results of empirical tests to date are summarized; these results provide impressive support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. We conclude that the popular and parsimonious explanation of prosocial motivation in terms of universal egoism must give way to a pluralistic explanation that includes altruism as well as egoism. Implications of such a pluralism are briefly noted, not only for our understanding of prosocial motivation but also for our understanding of human nature and of the emotion-motivation link. We humans devote much time and energy to helping others. We send money to rescue famine victims halfway around the world. We work to save whales. We stay up all night to comfort a friend who has just suffered a broken relationship. We stop on a busy highway to help a stranded motorist change a flat.

The construct of empathy may be located conceptually at several different points in the network of interpersonal cognition and emotion. We discuss one specific form of emotional empathy--other-focused feelings evoked by perceiving another person in need. First, evidence is reviewed suggesting that there are at least two distinct types of congruent emotional responses to perceiving another in need: feelings of personal distress (e.g., alarmed, upset, worried, disturbed, distressed, troubled, etc.) and feelings of empathy (e.g., sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm, softhearted, etc.). Next, evidence is reviewed suggesting that these two emotional responses have different motivational consequences. Personal distress seems to evoke egoistic motivation to reduce one's own aversive arousal, as a traditional Hullian tension-reduction model would propose. Empathy does not. The motivation evoked by empathy may instead be altruistic, for the ultimate goal seems to be reduction of the other's need, not reduction of one's own aversive arousal. Overall, the recent empirical evidence appears to support the more differentiated view of emotion and motivation proposed long ago by McDougall, not the unitary view proposed by Hull and his followers.

It has been suggested that empathy leads to altruistic rather than egoistic motivation to help. This hypothesis was tested by having subjects watch another female undergraduate receive electric shocks and then giving them a chance to help her by taking the remaining shocks themselves. In each of two experiments, subjects' level of empathic emotion (low versus high) and their ease of escape from continuing to watch the victim suffer if they did not help (easy versus difficult) were manipulated in a 2 X 2 design. We reasoned that if empathy led to altruistic motivation, subjects feeling a high degree of empathy for the victim should be as ready to help when escape without helping was easy as when it was difficult. But if empathy led to egoistic motivation, subjects feeling empathy should be more ready to help when escape was difficult than when it was easy. Results of each experiment followed the former pattern when empathy was high and the latter pattern when empathy was low, supporting the hypothesis that empathy leads to altruistic rather than egoistic motivation to help.

Prosocial motivation is egoistic when the ultimate goal is to increase one's own welfare; it is altruistic when the ultimate goal is to increase another's welfare. The view that all prosocial behavior, regardless how noble in appearance, is motivated by some form of self-benefits may seem cynical. But it is the dominant view in contemporary psychology. Most contemporary psychologists who use the term have no intention of challenging the dominant view that all human behavior, including all prosocial behavior, is motivated by self-serving, egoistic desires. Contemporary pseudoaltruistic views can be classified into three types: altruism as prosocial behavior, not motivation, altruism as prosocial behavior seeking internal rewards, and altruism as prosocial behavior to reduce aversive arousal. If altruistic motivation exists, then one has to make some fundamental changes in the conception of human motivation and indeed of human nature. As yet, the evidence is not sufficiently clear to justify such changes. If the conceptual analysis and research outlined in the chapter have merit, then the threshold of an empirical answer to the question why one care for other will be reached.

This chapter addresses two questions that empathy is supposed to answer and relate them to eight distinct phenomena that have been called empathy. The first is how one can know what another person is thinking and feeling and the second is what leads one person to respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another. The first phenomenon related to empathy is knowing someone else’s internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings, also known as cognitive empathy. The second is adopting the posture or matching the neural responses of an observed other, or facial empathy. The third concept is coming to feel as another person feels while the fourth is intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation. The fifth concept, imagining how another is thinking and feeling, has been variously termed psychological empathy, projection, and perspective taking. The last three phenomenon have been described as “changing places in fancy,” projective empathy, decentering, personal distress, pity, compassion, sympathetic distress, or simply sympathy.

Contents: The Question Posed by Our Concern for Others: Altruism or Egoism? Part I: The Altruism Question in Western Thought.Egoism and Altruism in Western Philosophy. Egoism and Altruism in Early Psychology. The Altruism Question in Contemporary Psychology. Part II: Toward an Answer: The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis.A Scientific Method for Addressing the Altruism Question. A Three- Path Model of Egoistic and Altruistic Motivation to Help: The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis. Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy- Altruism Hypothesis. Part III: Testing the Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy- Altruism Hypothesis.Aversive-Arousal Reduction. Empathy- Specific Punishment. Empathy-Specific Reward. Part IV: Extensions.Other Possible Sources of Altruistic Motivation: The Altruistic Personality. Implications and Limitations of the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis.

Research reveals that inducing empathy for a member of a stigmatized group can improve attitudes toward the group as a whole. But do these more positive attitudes translate into action on behalf of the group? Results of an experiment suggested an affirmative answer to this question. Undergraduates first listened to an interview with a convicted heroin addict and dealer; they were then given a chance to recommend allocation of Student Senate funds to an agency to help drug addicts. (The agency would not help the addict whose interview they heard.) Participants induced to feel empathy for the addict allocated more funds to the agency. Replicating past results, these participants also reported more positive attitudes toward people addicted to hard drugs. In addition, an experimental condition in which participants were induced to feel empathy for a fictional addict marginally increased action on behalf of, and more positive attitudes toward, drug addicts.

Abstract Prosocial behavior covers the broad range of actions intended to benefit one or more people other than oneself—actions such as helping, comforting, sharing, and cooperation. Altruism is motivation to increase another person's welfare; it is contrasted to egoism, the motivation to increase one's own welfare. There is no one‐to‐one correspondence between prosocial behavior and altruism. Prosocial behavior need not be motivated by altruism; altruistic motivation need not produce prosocial behavior. Over the past 30 years, the practical concern to promote prosocial behavior has led to both a variance‐accounted‐for empirical approach, which focuses on identifying situational and dispositional determinants of helping, and the application of existing psychological theories. Theories invoked to explain prosocial behavior include social learning, tension reduction, norm, exchange or equity, attribution, esteem‐enhancement, and moral reasoning theories. In addition, new theoretical perspectives have been developed by researchers focused on anomalous aspects of why people do—and don't—act prosocially. Their research has raised the possibility of a multiplicity of social motives—altruism, collectivism, and principlism, as well as egoism. It has also raised questions—as yet unanswered—about how these motives might be most effectively orchestrated to increase prosocial behavior.

Little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying prosocial decisions and how they are modulated by social factors such as perceived group membership. The present study investigates the neural processes preceding the willingness to engage in costly helping toward ingroup and outgroup members. Soccer fans witnessed a fan of their favorite team (ingroup member) or of a rival team (outgroup member) experience pain. They were subsequently able to choose to help the other by enduring physical pain themselves to reduce the other's pain. Helping the ingroup member was best predicted by anterior insula activation when seeing him suffer and by associated self-reports of empathic concern. In contrast, not helping the outgroup member was best predicted by nucleus accumbens activation and the degree of negative evaluation of the other. We conclude that empathy-related insula activation can motivate costly helping, whereas an antagonistic signal in nucleus accumbens reduces the propensity to help.

Two experiments tested the idea that empathy-induced helping is due to self–other merging. To manipulate empathy, half of the participants in each experiment received instructions to remain objective while hearing about a young woman in need (low-empathy condition), and half received instructions to

Two experiments examined the role of valuing the welfare of a person in need as an antecedent of empathic concern. Specifically, these experiments explored the relation of such valuing to a well-known antecedent--perspective taking. In Experiment 1, both perspective taking and valuing were manipulated, and each independently increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping behavior. In Experiment 2, only valuing was manipulated. Manipulated valuing increased measured perspective taking and, in part as a result, increased empathic concern, which, in turn, increased helping. Valuing appears to be an important, largely overlooked, situational antecedent of feeling empathy for a person in need.

How can people appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally? Two self-deception strategies were considered: (a) misperceive one's behavior as moral and (b) avoid comparing one's behavior with moral standards. In Studies 1 and 2 the authors documented the importance of the 2nd strategy but not the 1st. Among participants who flipped a coin to assign themselves and another participant fairly to tasks, even a clearly labeled coin that prevented misperception did not produce a fair result (Study 1). Inducing behavior-standard comparison through self-awareness did (Study 2). Study 3 qualified the self-awareness effect: When moral standards were not salient before acting, self-awareness no longer increased alignment of behavior with standards. Instead, it increased alignment of standards with behavior and produced less moral action. Overall, results showed 3 different faces of moral hypocrisy.

Results of 2 experiments supported the proposal that empathy-induced altruism can lead one to act in a way that violates the moral principle of justice. In each experiment, participants were asked to make an allocation decision that affected the welfare of other individuals. Participants who were not induced to feel empathy tended to act in accord with a principle of justice; participants who were induced to feel empathy were significantly more likely to violate this principle, allocating resources preferentially to the person for whom empathy was felt. High-empathy participants who showed partiality agreed with other participants in perceiving partiality to be less fair and less moral (Experiment 1). Overall, results suggested that empathy-induced altruism and the desire to uphold a moral principle of justice are independent prosocial motives that sometimes cooperate but sometimes conflict. Implications of this independence are discussed

Does religion promote prosocial behavior? A verdict not clear. Methodological and theoretical weaknesses in recent studies correlating religious orientation with social values (e.g., prejudice) led to the proposal of a new three dimensional model of religiosity. Religion as a Quest was considered along with the well known Means and End orientations (cf. Allport's extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity). These three dimensions were operationalized by use of complete-estimation factor scores on three factors derived from six religious orientation scales. Convergent and discriminant validity of the scales and factors were examined using both seminarian and undergraduate samples. Finding satisfactory validity, the three dimensional model was employed in three studies concerning the relationship of religious orientation and prosocial behavior. Study 1 suggested that the frequently reported link between intrinsic (End) religion and less prejudicial questionnaire responses could be an artifact of social desirability. Studies 2 and 3 concerned helping behavior. In both, the Quest orientation was found to relate to more tentative, situationally responsive helping. The End orientation related to more persistenthelping that was less attuned to the expressed needs of the person seeking aid. O xford philosopher Basil Mitchell (1955) tells the following parable: In a war torn country occupied by enemy forces a member of the resistance meets a stranger one night. The Stranger deeply impresses him. In the course of a long conversation the Stranger tells the partisan that he too on the side of the resistance, indeed that he in command of it, and urges the partisan to have faith in him no matter happens. The partisan, utterly convinced of the Stranger's sincerity and constancy, trusts him. In the ensuing months the partisan does not speak to the Stranger. But sometimes he sees the Stranger helping members of the resistance, and he grateful and says, He on our side. At other times he sees the Stranger in the uniform of the police handing patriots over to the occupying forces. In spite of this behavior and the grumbling of his friends, the partisan maintains that the Stranger is on our side. At such times the partisan's friends object, asking what would he have to do for you to admit that you were wrong and that he not really on our side, that he a double

Additional evidence is provided that empathic emotion can evoke altruistic motivation to help. To provide this evidence, we employed Stotland's (1969) technique for manipulating empathy; subjects were exposed to a person in distress and instructed either to observe the victim's reactions (low empathy) or to imagine the victim's feelings (high empathy). As in previous research testing the empathy-altruism hypothesis, this empathy manipulation was crossed with a manipulation of ease of escape without helping (easy vs. difficult) to form a 2X2 design. Results patterned as predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Subjects in the low-empathy condition helped less when escape was easy than when it was difficult. This pattern suggested that their helping was directed toward the egoistic goal of reducing their own distress. Subjects in the highempathy condition, however, displayed a high rate of helping, even when escape was easy. This pattern suggested that their helping was directed toward the altruistic goal of reducing the distress of the person in need. Finally, analyses of subjects' self-reported emotional response provided additional support for the hypothesis that feeling a predominance of empathy rather than distress on witnessing someone in need can evoke altruistic motivation. Evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis continues to mount, Is the motivation to help ever, in any degree, truly altruistic? That is, is a helper's ultimate goal ever to increase the victim's welfare, or is the motivation underlying helping always egoistic, designed to increase the helper's own welfare? This question, carrying as it does implications for one's view of human nature (Hoffman, 1981), was a central question for many 18th and 19th century

Results of 3 experiments suggest that feeling empathy for a member of a stigmatized group can improve attitudes toward the group as a whole. In Experiments 1 and 2, inducing empathy for a young woman with AIDS (Experiment 1) or a homeless man (Experiment 2) led to more positive attitudes toward people with AIDS or toward the homeless, respectively. Experiment 3 tested possible limits of the empathy-attitude effect by inducing empathy toward a member of a highly stigmatized group, convicted murderers, and measuring attitudes toward this group immediately and then 1-2 weeks later. Results provided only weak evidence of improved attitudes toward murderers immediately but strong evidence of improved attitudes 1-2 weeks later.

In this paper, concerns are addressed regarding the reliability of the Quest scale introduced by Batson (1976) and Batson and Ventis (1982). After briefly reviewing the evidence, we have concluded that, although the Batson and Ventis (1982) six-item Quest scale seems to have acceptable test-retest reliability, it has poor internal consistency. To remedy this problem, a new 12-item version of the Quest scale is herein proposed. This 12-item version has satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach's alphas in the .75 to .82 range) and, equally important, is highly correlated with the original six-item Quest scale (correlations in the .85 to .90 range). We recommend that both the new 12-item scale and the six-item version be used in future substantive research that seeks to assess the way in which a quest dimension of religion facilitates or inhibits personal adjustment and positive social behavior.

In this paper, concerns are addressed regarding the validity of the Quest scale introduced by Batson (1976) and Batson and Ventis (1982). Some have wondered whether this scale might be more a measure of agnosticism, of anti-orthodoxy, of sophomoric religious doubt, or of religious conflict, if indeed, it is a measure of anything religious at all. We have reviewed the available evidence regarding validity, much of which has appeared in unpublished research reports, theses, dissertations, or convention papers, and thus has not been widely available. Based on the evidence, we have concluded that the Quest scale does indeed measure a dimension of personal religion very much like the one it was designed to measure: an open-ended, active approach to existential questions that resists clearcut, pat answers. Concerns regarding the reliability of the Quest scale, which have proved more persistent, are addressed in a companion paper.

Recently, social psychologists have given considerable attention to the possibility that empathy can be used to improve intergroup attitudes and relations. For this possibility to bear practical fruit, it is important to know what is meant by empathy because different researchers use the term to refer to different psychological states. It is also important to understand how each of these empathy states might affect intergroup relations by reviewing theory and research on the psychological processes involved, and it is important to consider the limitations of each form of empathy as a source of improved intergroup relations. Finally, it is important to consider the role of different empathy states in existing programs designed to improve intergroup relations, whether in protracted political conflicts, in educational settings, or via media. In this article, we pursue each of these goals.

This book takes a hard-science look at the possibility that we humans have the capacity to care for others for their sakes (altruism) rather than simply for our own (egoism). The look is based not on armchair speculation, dramatic cases, or after-the-fact interviews, but on an extensive series of theory-testing laboratory experiments conducted over the past 35 years. Part I details the theory of altruistic motivation that has been the focus of this experimental research. The theory centers on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which claims that other-oriented feelings of sympathy and compassion for a person in need (empathic concern) produce motivation with the ultimate goal of having that need removed. Antecedents and consequences of empathy-induced altruistic motivation are specified, making the theory empirically testable. Part II offers a comprehensive summary of the research designed to test the empathy-altruism hypothesis, giving particular attention to recent challenges. Overall, the research provides remarkably strong and consistent support for this hypothesis, forcing a tentative conclusion that empathy-induced altruism is within the human repertoire. Part III considers the theoretical and practical implications of this conclusion, suggesting that empathy-induced altruism is a far more pervasive and powerful force in human affairs than has been recognized. Failure to appreciate its importance has handicapped attempts to understand why we humans act as we do and wherein our happiness lies. This failure has also handicapped efforts to promote better interpersonal relations and create a more caring, humane society.

A conceptual analysis is offered that differentiates four types of motivation for community involvement: egoism, altruism, collectivism, and principlism. Differentiation is based on identification of a unique ultimate goal for each motive. For egoism, the ultimate goal is to increase one's own welfare; for altruism, it is to increase the welfare of another individual or individuals; for collectivism, to increase the welfare of a group; and for principlism, to uphold one or more moral principles. As sources of community involvement, each of these four forms of motivation has its strengths; each also has its weaknesses. More effective efforts to stimulate community involvement may come from strategies that orchestrate motives so that the strengths of one motive can overcome weaknesses of another. Among the various possibilities, strategies that combine appeals to either altruism or collectivism with appeals to principle may be especially promising.

A conceptual analysis is offered that differentiates four motives for acting for the public good: egoism, collectivism, altruism, and principlism. Differentiation is based on identification of a unique ultimate goal for each motive. For egoism, the ultimate goal is self-benefit; for collectivism, it is to increase group welfare; for altruism, to increase one or more other individuals' welfare; for principlism, to uphold one or more moral principles. Advocates claim that these last three motives cannot be reduced to egoism. Evidence for this claim is limited, however, especially for collectivism and principlism. It is hoped that the conceptual distinctions proposed will permit broader, more precise empirical study of nonegoistic motives for acting for the public good.

Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.

Abstract What accounts for variation in empathy felt for strangers in need? Currently, one of the most popular explanations among personality and social psychologists is perceived similarity: We feel sympathy and compassion for others to the degree that we perceive them to be like us. Two experiments designed to test the perceived similarity explanation more directly than previous research failed to find support. Results of the second experiment instead supported a classical, but currently less popular, explanation of empathy felt for strangers: nurturant tendencies based on the impulse to care for and protect offspring. We noted distinct theoretical and practical implications of the similarity and nurturance explanations. In addition, we encourage increased attention to nurturance as a possible source of empathy.

We predicted that feeling empathy for another member of the collective in a social dilemma would create an altruistic desire to allocate resources to that person as an individual, reducing collective good. To test this prediction, 2 studies were run. In each, participants faced a dilemma in which they could choose to benefit themselves, the group, or other group members as individuals. In Study 1, empathy for another group member was manipulated; in Study 2, naturally occurring empathic response was determined by self-report. In both studies, participants who experienced high empathy allocated more resources to the target of empathy, reducing the overall collective good. These results suggest the importance of considering self-interest, collective interest, and other-interest (altruism) as three distinct motives, each of which may operate in social dilemmas

Abstract Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared‐for other, not unfairness per se . In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Can empathy-induced altruism motivate a person to cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma? To answer this question, 60 undergraduate women were placed in a one-trial prisoner's dilemma, and empathy for the other person was manipulated. Regardless of whether the dilemma was framed as a social exchange or as a business transaction, cooperation was significantly higher among those women led to feel empathy for the other than among those not led to feel empathy. Among those not led to feel empathy, the business frame reduced cooperation, lending support to the idea of an exemption on moral motivation in business transactions. Lack of a business exemption on empathy-induced altruism supported the suggestion that altruism is not simply a type of moral motivation, but is a distinct form of prosocial motivation. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Two studies addressed alternative explanations for 3 pieces of evidence supporting the existence of moral hypocrisy. In Study 1, no support was found for the idea that low salience of social standards accounts for falsifying the result of a coin flip to assign oneself a more desirable task. In Study 2, no support was found for the idea that responses of those who honestly win the flip account for the higher ratings of morality of their action by participants who assign themselves the more desirable task after flipping the coin. Also, no support was found for the idea that responses of those who honestly win the flip account for the inability of personal moral responsibility measures to predict moral action. Instead, results of both studies provided additional evidence of moral hypocrisy.

Abstract What if participants in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma know before making their decision that the other person has already defected? From the perspective of classic game theory, a dilemma no longer exists. It is clearly in their best interest to defect too. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts, however, that if they feel empathy for the other, then a dilemma remains: self‐interest counsels defection; empathy‐induced altruism counsels not. This motivational conflict should lead at least some empathically aroused individuals not to defect. To test this prediction, we placed 60 undergraduate women in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma in which they knew the other had already defected. Among those not induced to feel empathy, very few (0.05) did not defect in return. Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, almost half (0.45) did not defect. These results underscore the power of empathy‐induced altruism to affect responses in a prisoner's dilemma. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Often people fail to respond to these in need. Why? In addition to cognitive and perceptual processes such as oversight and diffusion of responsibility, a motivational process may lead people, at times, to actively avoid feeling empathy for those in need, lest they be motivated to help them. It is predicted that empathy avoidance will occur when, before exposure to a person in need, people are aware that:(a) they will be asked to help this person and (b) helping will be costly. To test this prediction, Ss were given the choice of hearing 1 of 2 versions of an appeal by a homeless man for help: an empathyinducing version or a non-empathy-inducing version. As predicted, those aware that they soon would be given a high-cost opportunity to help the man chose to hear the empathy-inducing version less often than did those either unaware of the upcoming opportunity or aware but led to believe that helping involved low cost

The previously reported negative correlation between intrinsic religion and racial prejudice could be an artifact of social desirability. To test this proposition, 51 undergraduates interested in religion participated in a study. Racial prejudice was measured in two ways, in a standard questionnaire session and in a situation where responses had clear behavioral consequences. Consistent with previous research, intrinsic religion correlated negatively with the questionnaire measure of prejudice. But as expected, intrinsic religion also correlated positively with a measure of social desirability. When the effects of social desirability were controlled, the negative correlation between intrinsic religion and prejudice either diminished (psychometric control) or disappeared (behavioral control). Another orientation to religion, religion as quest, correlated negatively with racial prejudice even when social desirability was controlled.

Three experiments tested whether empathy evokes egoistic motivation to share vicariously in the victim's joy at improvement (the empathic-joy hypothesis) instead of altruistic motivation to increase the victim's welfare (the empathy-altruism hypothesis). In Experiment 1, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy for a young woman in need were given a chance to help her. Some believed that if they helped they would receive feedback about her improvement; others did not. In Experiments 2 and 3, Ss induced to feel either low or high empathy were given a choice of getting update information about a needy person's condition. Before choosing, they were told the likelihood of the person's condition having improved--and of their experiencing empathic joy--was 20%, was 50%, or was 80%. Results of none of the experiments patterned as predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis; instead, results of each were consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

Cognitive dissonance theory assumes that man is a rationalizing animal, actively defending himself by means of distortion and denial against information which contradicts deeply held beliefs. In contrast, recent critiques of dissonance theory by Bern and others picture man as a rational, if fallible, information processor. A study is reported in which adolescent females were given a chance to commit themselves publicly to a religious belief and were then faced with information which seemed to disconfirm that belief. Consistent with dissonance interpretations of earlier field studies, subjects who both expressed belief and accepted the veracity of the disconfirming information subsequently expressed a significant increase in intensity of belief. This reaction was not found among subjects who either had not expressed initial belief or had not accepted the veracity of the disconfirming information. Possible limitations on the generality of these results are emphasized.

The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that prosocial motivation associated with feeling empathy for a person in need is directed toward the ultimate goal of benefiting that person, not toward some subtle form of self-benefit. We explored two new egoistic alternatives to this hypothesis. The empathy-specific reward hypothesis proposes that the prosocial motivation associated with empathy is directed toward the goal of obtaining social or self-rewards (i.e., praise, honor, and pride). The empathy-specific punishment hypothesis proposes that this motivation is directed toward the goal of avoiding social or self-punishments (i.e., censure, guilt, and shame). Study 1 provided an initial test of the empathy-specific reward hypothesis. Studies 2 through 4 used three procedures to test the empathy-specific punishment hypothesis. In Study 5, a Stroop procedure was used to assess the role of reward-relevant, punishment-relevant, and victim-relevant cognitions in mediating the empathy-helping relationship. Results of these five studies did not support either the empathy-specific reward or the empathy-specific punishment hypothesis. Instead, results of each supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Evidence that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation continues to mount.

Failure of moral people to act morally is usually attributed to either learning deficits or situational pressures. We believe that it is also important to consider the nature of moral motivation. Is the goal actually to be moral (moral integrity) or only to appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of being moral (moral hypocrisy)? Do people initially intend to be moral, only to surrender this goal when the costs of being moral become clear (overpowered integrity)? We have found evidence of both moral hypocrisy and overpowered integrity. Each can lead ostensibly moral people to act immorally. These findings raise important questions for future research on the role of moral principles as guides to behavior.

Two studies tested the prediction that having had prior experience with a need increases empathy for another person currently experiencing that need. In Study 1, subjects reported their feelings of empathy after observing a same-sex peer endure mild but uncomfortable electric shocks. Compared with those given no prior experience with the shocks, women who had prepared to receive the shocks themselves reported more empathy, whereas men who had prepared reported less. In Study 2, subjects reported their feelings of empathy after reading a transcript in which a same-sex adolescent described an upsetting life experience. Women who had had a similar experience during adolescence reported more empathy than women who had not; men who had had a similar experience reported no more empathy than men who had not. Across both studies, then, prior experience with the need increased empathy among women but not among men.

Are the intrinsically religious less likely to help a person if that person's behavior violates conventional values ? If so, is it because they have antipathy toward the person or toward the behavior ? To answer these questions, 90 undergraduates were given the opportunity to help either of two same-sex peers win a monetary prize. About one peer, they knew nothing; from the other, they had received two self-disclosing notes. The first note either did or did not reveal that the discloser was gay ; the second revealed that the discloser wanted the money for an activity that either would or would not promote homosexuality. Participants scoring high on measures of devout, intrinsic religion helped the gay discloser less than the non-gay, even when their help would not promote homosexuality. These results suggest that devout, intrinsic religion is associated with antipathy toward value violators, not just toward value-violating acts ; it is associated with compassion that is circumscribed, not universal.

R. B. Cialdini, S. L. Brown, B. P. Lewis, C. Luce, & S. L. Neuberg (1997) present data that they claim challenge the empathy-altruism hypothesis by providing evidence that the effects of empathy on helping are due to self-other merging. Despite S. L. Neuberg et al.'s (1997) efforts at reassurance, doubts remain about the meaning of these data because they were obtained using scenario procedures and confounded manipulations. Using less questionable methods, C. D. Batson et al. (1997) failed to find evidence that empathy-induced helping was due to self-other merging. At a more fundamental level, the Cialdini et al. challenge rests on an apparent misunderstanding of the empathy-altruism hypothesis and, as a result, of appropriate means to test it. Finally, the question of whether empathy leads to anything more than superficial helping is addressed.

Three aspects of Allport's original concept of mature religion appear to be omitted from his later, highly-popular concept of religion as an intrinsic end in itself. These aspects are (a) readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity, (b) perception of religious doubts as positive, and (c) openness to future change in one's religious views. Batson and Ventis claim that these three aspects are included in Batson's concept of religion as a quest. Consistent with this claim, evidence is presented which indicates that the quest orientation correlates positively with greater cognitive complexity in dealing with existential concerns, while the intrinsic, end orientation does not.

Current need and vulnerability are two different forms of need. Integrating (a) cognitive-appraisal theories of emotion with (b) a view of human parental nurturance as emotionally based and cognitively generalizable, this article proposes that these two forms of need elicit distinct empathic emotions: Vulnerability evokes feelings of tenderness, whereas current need evokes feelings of sympathy. Results of two experiments support this proposal. Vulnerable targets elicited tenderness even when there was no current need; nonvulnerable targets did not. Sympathy was low when there was no evidence of current need but high when there was evidence of current need. Other forms of need and other empathic emotions are proposed, as are motivational and behavioral consequences of the distinction between tenderness and sympathy.

Abstract The present research was conducted to explore genetic influences on empathic concern for others. First, an index of empathic concern was created by combining relevant items from Gough's Adjective Check List (ACL). This index was validated by correlating scores of 88 undergraduates on the index with their scores on a self‐report measure of empathy, which has been related to prosocial behavior. Correlations were sufficiently high to accept the validity of the index. Next, previously collected ACL responses of 114 monozygotic (MZ) and 116 dizygotic (DZ) twins were reanalyzed in order to create an empathic concern score for each twin. The twins were middle‐aged males initially raised together but living apart at the time they completed the ACL. Comparison of intraclass correlations for MZ and DZ twins revealed, as predicted by the genetic hypothesis, significant ( p < .005) heritability in empathic concern scores. This finding suggests that there may, indeed, be a genetic influence on individual differences in empathic concern for others. Some limitations of the present data are also considered. How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him.

Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from anger at the harm caused by standard-violating behavior. Recent research that used experimental manipulation to disentangle these different forms of anger found evidence of personal and empathic anger, but not of moral outrage. We sought to extend this research by assessing anger at a more extreme moral violation: torture. If the person tortured is a member of one’s group (nationality), anger may not be over the moral violation but over the harm done to one of “us.” In an experiment designed to create the necessary appraisal conditions, we found clear evidence of identity-relevant personal anger (anger when a person from one’s nationality is tortured) but little evidence of moral outrage (anger even when a person from an identity-irrelevant nationality is tortured). Implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are discussed.

In each of two experiments, some participants chose between allocation of resources to the group as a whole or to themselves alone (egoism condition); some chose between allocation to a group or to a group member for whom they were induced to feel empathy (altruism condition); and some chose between allocation to a group or to a member for whom empathy was not induced (baseline condition). When the decision was private, allocation to the group was significantly—and similarly—lower in the egoism and altruism conditions compared to the baseline. When the decision was public, allocation to the group was significantly lower only in the altruism condition. These results indicated, first, that both egoism and altruism can be potent threats to the common good and, second, that anticipated social evaluation is a powerful inhibitor of the egoistic but not the altruistic threat.

Are those with a high‐quest orientation to religion less likely to help a person if that person's behavior violates their values of open‐mindedness and tolerance? If so, is it because they have antipathy toward the person or toward the behavior? To answer these questions, sixty undergraduate women were given the opportunity to help either of two same‐sex peers win a monetary prize. About one peer, they knew nothing; from the other, they had received two self‐disclosing notes. The first note either did or did not reveal that the discloser was intolerant of gays; the second revealed that the discloser wanted the money for an activity that either would or would not promote intolerance of gays. Participants scoring high on measures of quest religion helped the intolerant discloser less than the discloser who was not intolerant when their help would promote intolerance; they did not help the intolerant discloser less when their help would not promote intolerance. These results suggest that a high‐quest orientation is associated with antipathy toward the value‐violating behavior (intolerance), not toward the value‐violating person. The scope of the associated compassion seems relatively broad.

(1991). Encouraging Words Concerning the Evidence for Altruism. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 159-168.

Donald Campbell a propose une conception du role de la religion comme facilitatrice du comportement prosocial. Une vision differente est argumentee ici, a partir de la litterature sociobiologique ainsi que de theories et de recherches psychologiques recentes mettant en valeur une impulsion altruiste genetiquement determinee

Two experiments were conducted to determine whether an extrinsic incentive would undermine intrinsic, altruistic motivation for helping. In Experiment 1 male undergraduates agreed to help an experimenter code data. Pavment for coding was not mentioned (no-payment), was mentioned prior to agreement to help (paynent-prior), or was mentioned after agreement to help (payment-after). As predicted from Nisbett and Valins' overly sufficient justification hypothesis, subjects in the payment-prior condition rated themselves as less altruistic relative to a comparison other who did not help (a confederate) than did subjects in the no-payment condition. Subjects in the payment-after condition and in the no-request control group responded similarly to those in the no-payment condition. Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication in a field setting of the payment-prior and no-payment conditions of Experiment 1. Results again indicated that prior payment undermined intrinsic, altruistic motivation for helping.

Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards.

Abstract Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—is claimed to be a prevalent and powerful moral emotion. However, evidence for moral outrage has been compromised by failure to distinguish it from personal anger—anger at harm to self—felt by victims of a moral violation. Although it does not seem possible to distinguish these two forms of anger by measurement, it is possible to do so by experimental manipulation of their distinct eliciting conditions. Extending previous research, the current study manipulated how a victim (self vs. stranger) was excluded (fairly vs. unfairly) from a favorable experience. Reported anger and behavioral retribution provided evidence of personal anger and revenge, not of moral outrage. These findings suggest that the prevalence and power of moral outrage has been exaggerated. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Everything we do, no matter how noble and seemingly self-sacrificial, is really directed toward the ultimate goal of self-benefit. Comte considered altruism and egoism to be two distinct motives within the individual. The strong form of psychological hedonism is inconsistent with the possibility of altruism, but to affirm this form is simply to assert universal egoism. Collectivism is motivation to benefit a particular group as a whole. Different forms of prosocial motivation are usually assumed to be mutually supportive and cooperative. Altruism, collectivism, and principlism are often confused or equated. There is a logical limit to the experimental tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

Clark and Mills claim that communal and exchange relationships differ in the rules that govern giving and receiving benefits. In exchange relationships, members benefit each other to incur or repay obligation, quid pro quo. In communal relationships, the basis of benefit is concern for the other's welfare. Response by Clark and Mills to three criticism suggests, however that the psychological difference they see between communal and exchange relationships is less than might be imagined. They say that benefits in communal relationships may be bestowed with an eye to gaining self-benefits, including (a) the social and self-rewards for fulfilling one's role obligations and (b) the benefits received from the partner in the form of having one's needs met or establishing a rewarding relationship. If this is true, then quid pro quo exchange principles seem to operate in both communal and exchange relationships; the difference is in the breadth and etiquette of benefits exchanged.

Interpersonal sensitivity refers to our ability to perceive and respond with care to the internal states (e.g., cognitive, affective, motivational) of another, understand the antecedents of those states, and predict the subsequent events that will result. This special issue brings together new research findings from empirical studies, including work with adults and children, genetics, functional neuroimaging, individual differences, and behavioral measures, which examine how we process and respond to information about our fellow individuals. By combining biological and psychological approaches, social neuroscience sheds new light on the complex and multi-faceted phenomenon of interpersonal sensitivity, including empathy. One should, however, be aware of the challenges and limits of such an approach.

An experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that being in a hurry does not reduce helping, it forces the potential helper to decide whom to help. It was predicted that if others were dependent on a hurrying individual to get somewhere quickly he would not stop; if others were not dependent, he would. Male undergraduates were informed that their data either were or were not vital for successful completion of a research project. They were then sent to another building to participate in the project. Half were told that they were late and must hurry; half were told they had ample time. On route, all encountered a male confederate slumped on the stairs, coughing and groaning. Results indicated that, as predicted, the importance of their data to the experimenter had a significant effect on whether subjects in a hurry would offer aid to the victim.

The adequacy of currently popular accounts of the genetic basis for psychological altruism, including inclusive fitness (kin selection), reciprocal altruism, sociality, and group selection, is questioned. Problems exist both with the evidence cited as supporting these accounts and with the relevance of the accounts to what is being explained. Based on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, a more plausible account is proposed: generalized parental nurturance. It is suggested that four evolutionary developments combined to provide a genetic basis for psychological altruism. First is the evolution in mammals of parental nurturance. Second is the evolution in humans (and possibly a few other species) of the ability to see others as sentient, intentional agents and, thereby, to recognize other's needs, even subtle ones. Third is the evolution in humans of tender, empathic emotions as an important component of parental nurturance. Fourth is the evolution in humans of cognitive capacities that make it possible to generalize tender, empathic feelings and, thereby, altruism beyond offspring.

Most works on moral psychology direct our attention to the positive role morality plays for us as individuals, as a society, even as a species. In What's Wrong with Morality?, C. Daniel Batson takes a different approach: he looks at morality as a problem. The problem is not that it is wrong to be moral, but that our morality often fails to produce these intended results. Why? Some experts believe the answer lies in lack of character. Others say we are victims of poor judgment. If we could but discern what is morally right, whether through logical analysis and discourse, through tuned intuition and a keen moral sense, or through feeling and sentiment, we would act accordingly. Implicit in these different views is the assumption that if we grow up properly, if we can think and feel as we should, and if we can keep a firm hand on the tiller through the storms of circumstance, all will be well. We can realize our moral potential. Many of our best writers of fiction are less optimistic. Astute observers of the human condition like Austen, Balzac, Dickens, Dostoyevsky, Eliot, Tolstoy, and Twain suggest our moral psychology is more complex. These writers encourage us to look more closely at our motives, emotions, and values, at what we really care about in the moral domain. In this volume, Batson examines this issue from a social-psychological perspective. Drawing on research suggesting our moral life is fertile ground for rationalization and deception, including self-deception, Batson offers a hard-nosed analysis of morality and its limitations in this expertly written book. Available in OSO:

The empathy-altruism hypothesis predicts that empathically aroused individuals will report negative mood change after an unsuccessful attempt to help, even if the failure is fully justified. Two experiments tested this prediction. In Experiment 1, subjects'failure at a helping task was either justified or not. As predicted, low-empathy subjects showed relatively little negative mood change when theirfailure was justified, whereas high-empathy subjects showed substantial negative mood change. In Experiment 2 a different manipulation of empathy was used, and mood change was assessed after success on a helping task failed to relieve the other's need. Again as predicted, low-empathy subjects showed little mood change, whereas high-empathy subjects showed substantial negative mood change. Results of each experiment, then, supported the empathy-altruism hypothesis.

Experiences sur les motivations altruistes ou egocentriques qui peuvent expliquer l'aide accordee a une personne qui ne se trouve pas en situation de detresse: mise en evidence de l'importance de l'attachement affectif dans ces motivations

Goldfried and Miner (2002) claimed to provide evidence that those high in quest religion are less likely to help a religiously closed‐minded person even when the help does not promote closed‐mindedness. As a result, they concluded that quest religion is associated with limited, not universal, compassion. An experiment modeled on theirs but avoiding several methodological problems suggested a very different conclusion. Although participants high in quest religion helped a religiously closed‐minded person less when doing so promoted closed‐mindedness, they were no less likely to help such a person when it did not promote closed‐mindedness. These results suggest that quest religion is associated with antipathy toward promoting closed‐mindedness, not with antipathy toward religiously closed‐minded persons. The scope of compassion associated with quest religion does not appear to be limited in the way Goldfried and Miner claimed.

Cialdini has proposed a reciprocal concessions explanation of the door-in-the-face technique for inducing compliance. We wish to propose an alternative explanation, that this technique increases compliance because it induces concern about self-presentation. A field experiment was designed to determine whether the manipulations used in previous door-in-the-face studies led to assumptions of a negative self-presentation. Fifty male university students were presented with either a moderately large request for help (similar to those used in the door-in-the-face studies) or an extremely large request. After refusing the request subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire. Responses to this questionnaire indicated that subjects believed an observer of their refusal would rate them as significantly less helpful, less friendly, and less concerned after they refused the moderately large as opposed to the extremely large request. These results were predicted by our selfpresentation explanation of the door-in-the-face technique.

Compassion and compliance are two very different self-attributions for agreeing to help someone in need; further, they should have very different consequences for subsequent behavior. Specifically, to see oneself as a compassionate individual should be self-rewarding, leading to the likelihood of helping in response to subsequent requests. But to see oneself as a compliant individual should be self-punishing, making one more reluctant to help in the future. Results of an experiment supported these predictions. Forty female undergraduates, each paired with a confederate, agreed to help in response to a request. As predicted, subjects led to make a compassion attribution for their response to an initial request volunteered more help when presented with a second request than did subjects led to make a compliance attribution for their initial helping.

Do we humans ever, in any degree, care about others for their sakes and not simply for our own? Psychology has long assumed that everything humans do, no matter how nice and noble, is motivated by self-interest. However, research over the past three decades suggests that this assumption is wrong. This research has focused on the empathy—altruism hypothesis, which claims that empathic concern—an other-oriented emotional response elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of a person in need—produces altruistic motivation—motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare. Results of the over 30 experiments designed to test this hypothesis against various egoistic alternatives have proved remarkably supportive, leading to the tentative conclusion that feeling empathic concern for a person in need does indeed evoke altruistic motivation to see that need relieved. Sources of altruistic motivation other than empathy also have been proposed, but as yet, there is not compelling research evidence to support these proposals. Two additional forms of prosocial motivation have also been proposed: collectivism and principlism. Collectivism—motivation with the ultimate goal of benefiting some group or collective as a whole—has been claimed to result from group identity. Principlism—motivation with the ultimate goal of upholding some moral principle—has long been advocated by religious teachers and moral philosophers. Whether either is a separate form of motivation, independent of and irreducible to egoism, is not yet clear. Research done to test for the existence of empathy-induced altruism may serve as a useful model for future research testing for the existence of collectivism and principlism. Theoretical and practical implications of the empathy-altruism hypothesis are briefly considered.

Freud (1927, 1930) claimed that devout, intrinsic religion buffers the threat of social isolation, rejection, and loneliness. We reasoned that if Freud was right, then reminding people of their vulnerability to loneliness should lead to increases in self-reported levels of intrinsic religion. To test this prediction, 72 undergraduates at least moderately interested in religion first completed three scales tapping different dimensions of personal religion: Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Quest. About a week later, each subject performed a writing task that either did or did not make vulnerability to loneliness salient, and then completed the three religious orientation scales again. Supporting Freud's claim, high-loneliness-salience subjects reported higher scores on the Intrinsic scale on the second administration, whereas low-salience subjects did not. This effect was specific to the Intrinsic scale; there was no effect of loneliness-salience on either the Extrinsic or Quest scales.

Chapter 25 Religion and Prejudice C. Daniel Batson, C. Daniel BatsonSearch for more papers by this authorE. L. Stocks, E. L. StocksSearch for more papers by this author C. Daniel Batson, C. Daniel BatsonSearch for more papers by this authorE. L. Stocks, E. L. StocksSearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):John F. Dovidio, John F. DovidioSearch for more papers by this authorPeter Glick, Peter GlickSearch for more papers by this authorLaurie A. Rudman, Laurie A. RudmanSearch for more papers by this author First published: 01 January 2005 https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470773963.ch25Citations: 19 AboutPDFPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShareShare a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Summary This chapter contains section titled: Allport's Explanation of the Relation Between Religion and Prejudice Data, Doubts, and Developments Since 1954 New Framework: A Revised View of the Religion-Prejudice Relationship What Would Allport Say? Future Directions: Where Would Allport Point Us? Citing Literature On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years after Allport RelatedInformation

Experimentation, a research method that has proven extremely useful in other areas of psychology, has been used only rarely in psychology of religion. The value of experimentation lies in its effectiveness in testing scientific theories. Lack of experimentation may be one reason there has been so little progress in developing and testing scientific theories in psychology of religion. But ethical and practical restrictions make it unlikely that experimentation will ever be widely used in research on religion. Quasi-experimental methods do, however, seem possible. Several quasi-experimental designs particulary relevant to psychological research on religion are discussed, and greater use of quasi-experimental methods is encouraged.

Abstract The empathy-altruism hypothesis states that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation. In this hypothesis, empathic concernrefers to other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of a person in need; it includes feelings of sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like. Altruistic motivationrefers to a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of the person with the empathy-inducing need. Over 35 experiments designed to test the empathy-altruism hypothesis provide remarkably consistent support. One—possibly surprising—corollary of this hypothesis is that empathy-induced altruism is not necessarily a source of moral behavior. Like egoism, it can promote violation of one’s moral standards. Experimental evidence supports this corollary. The evidence suggests that altruism and moral motivation are distinct goal-directed motives, each with strengths and weaknesses as a source of moral behavior. Wise orchestration is needed to harmonize their strengths.